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The Free Sea: The American Fight for Freedom of
Navigation, by James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo.
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018. 416
pages. $39.95.

For most of its 235 years of independent
existence, the United States has been a
continental power. The period when it
can be viewed reasonably as a maritime
power ended during the Civil War,
although admittedly its maritime roots
stretch back far into the colonial era. It
is therefore remarkable that it should
have remained a strong defender of
the freedom of the seas without interruption from its origins to the present
day. James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo,
two writers and legal advocates well
known for their robust defense of
that freedom, have written a history
explaining the main events that have
driven generations of policy makers
to support what may be regarded as
America’s oldest and most consistently
held foreign policy objective, and why
that support remains vital today.
That consistency, however, hides shifting
motivations. In the decades following
independence, trade was essential if
the United States was to survive. Wars
were fought with France (the QuasiWar), with Barbary, and with Britain
to defend America’s right as a neutral
to trade with whomever it pleased.
Kraska and Pedrozo move without
comment from 1812 to 1914, jumping
a near century of momentous change.
For America, trade, once a necessity for
survival, became the key to vast wealth.
U.S. goods carried in U.S. ships fanned
out across the world’s oceans. Irritations
with Britain persisted—entirely to be
expected between competitors—but
then so did episodes of cooperation. The
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main reason why Americans were free to
trade globally was the Royal Navy’s enforcement of Pax Britannica and Britain’s
adoption of free trade in 1846. However,
Britain’s agreement to the Declaration
of Paris in 1856 had possibly the most
significant effect on U.S. shipping and
the U.S. Navy. In it, Britain surrendered
its asserted right to institute paper
blockades of enemy ports and search
neutral shipping for contraband—that
is to say, for goods that Britain defined
as being of use to an enemy in wartime.
The result of this agreement was to turn
the naval order of the oceans on its head.
Neutral states, instead of combining
to limit British naval power—a very
risky undertaking—now had Britain
on their side. The United States, having
built its navy on the twin pillars of
coastal defense and guerre de course,
was stripped of its main strategic
weapon. A decade later, following the
Civil War—during which Confederate
privateers had driven much of America’s
merchant navy to seek the protection
of the British flag—the nation turned
its commercial attention away from the
sea. It was never to return, as the nation
looked instead to the vast, endless acres
west of the Mississippi and the creation
of an industrial heartland beyond
the Appalachians. Yet it is never wise
to say never in politics or history.
The real target of Kraska and Pedrozo’s
book is contemporary China, which,
after it emerged from its own civil war
in 1949, decided to become a maritime
power. By this it meant a power
capable of exploiting every economic
and political advantage the sea offered.
Although its progress was hindered by
the Cultural Revolution (1966–76) and
other upheavals, it continued to inch
toward its goal. Now it is advancing its
agenda rapidly, on multiple fronts.
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The United States, after the American
Civil War, took a different course, abandoning its maritime heritage and replacing it with a naval form of the militarism
that was gaining ground in Germany, the
other rising industrial power, by adopting the battle fleet theories of Mahan,
Luce, Fiske, and others. It was a turn that
served the Navy well for most of what
remained of the twentieth century, as the
service used its vastly superior material
resources to overwhelm its symmetrical
opponents. In the process, freedom of
the sea, particularly after 1945—the
period from which the authors draw
most of their examples—ceased to be
about trade, becoming rather about
the freedom of naval forces to go
where they needed to project power.
China presents a different challenge.
Germany, Japan, and Soviet Russia were
all economic autarkies; China is the
opposite. It now has the world’s secondlargest economy and is the largest trading power; it uses its growing navy as
just one of a set of political, diplomatic,
industrial, technological, informational,
and legal tools to advance its interests.
Kraska and Pedrozo have looked at the
legal challenge with a gimlet eye. They
have provided not only an invaluable description of the threat China
presents to the U.S. Navy but a guide
to legal ripostes to Chinese behavior
that can be implemented now. They
have written a handbook for action
and a historical justification that all
officials working on China must read.
Their analysis and the prescription it
generates must, however, be read in
context. Like Britain in Paris in 1856,
we need the vision, flexibility, and
guile to win all nations with maritime
interests over to our side. We need
to be their champion, as Woodrow
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Wilson purported to be in 1918, when
he made freedom of the seas one of his
Fourteen Points. More than that we
need to begin thinking and acting like a
maritime nation again. Maybe then we
can stay one step ahead of China at sea.
MARTIN N. MURPHY

Maritime Strategies for the XXI Century: The Contribution of Admiral Castex, by Lars Wedin. Paris:
Nuvis, 2016. 233 pages. $30.

It is a matter of interest when an author
is willing to break out some of the
older volumes on maritime strategy and
reexamine them in the light of current
concerns, attempting to determine
whether some nugget of interest has
been passed over inadvertently. Lars
Wedin’s Maritime Strategies for the XXI
Century: The Contribution of Admiral
Castex is such a work. Wedin examines
the writings of French admiral Raoul
Castex (1878–1968) for their applicability in creating maritime strategies for
the present millennium. This is not
an easy task. Castex was a voluminous
writer throughout his naval career,
authoring five books on strategic theory;
two additional volumes of collected
articles were compiled posthumously.
As a naval officer serving on escort
ships during the First World War,
Castex had the practical experience of
observing what actually worked—above
and beyond what any academician
might propose. Following that conflict,
Castex appreciated the opportunities
that technological advances in aircraft
and submarines might provide to the
future naval commander. Given his
lengthy naval career, wartime experience, and attentiveness to technological
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